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VeillaxandClaude Sonnet 5.5 6753422f7a model: Site and Mapping carry optional tags
CI / test (push) Failing after 55s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 03:29:26 -06:00
VeillaxandClaude Sonnet 5.5 64101e00d2 secretbox: add AES-256-GCM sealing of small secrets
CI / test (push) Successful in 1m20s
Moved out of Hammerhead's internal package so Sandbar can use it too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 23:21:56 -06:00
4 changed files with 144 additions and 2 deletions

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Reef # Reef
A shared library for Hammerhead, Blacktip, and Bamboo A shared library for Hammerhead, Blacktip, Bamboo and Sandbar
Shared types and building blocks for the sharks stack: [Hammerhead](https://git.veillax.com/Veillax/hammerhead) (control plane), [Blacktip](https://git.veillax.com/Veillax/blacktip) (edge) and [Bamboo](https://git.veillax.com/Veillax/bamboo) (site agent). Shared types and building blocks for the sharks stack: [Hammerhead](https://git.veillax.com/Veillax/hammerhead) (control plane), [Blacktip](https://git.veillax.com/Veillax/blacktip) (edge) and [Bamboo](https://git.veillax.com/Veillax/bamboo) (site agent).
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Reef holds the code all three programs agree on, so each can be built and releas
| `netguard` | Refuses internal addresses for anything that connects out on a user's behalf (webhooks, mail delivery), and dials the address it checked | | `netguard` | Refuses internal addresses for anything that connects out on a user's behalf (webhooks, mail delivery), and dials the address it checked |
| `docker` | Lists running containers through the Docker Engine API, with no SDK | | `docker` | Lists running containers through the Docker Engine API, with no SDK |
| `dotenv` | Loads a `.env` file into the environment without overriding real variables | | `dotenv` | Loads a `.env` file into the environment without overriding real variables |
| `secretbox` | AES-256-GCM sealing of small secrets (`enc1:` values) before they are written to a database |
## Using it ## Using it
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@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ type Site struct {
Local bool `json:"local"` Local bool `json:"local"`
EdgeID string `json:"edgeId,omitempty"` // the edge a local site belongs to EdgeID string `json:"edgeId,omitempty"` // the edge a local site belongs to
TunnelIP string `json:"tunnelIp,omitempty"` // the site's address inside the tunnel network Tags []string `json:"tags,omitempty"` // labels for grouping and filtering in the dashboard
TunnelIP string `json:"tunnelIp,omitempty"` // the site's address inside the tunnel network
PublicKey string `json:"publicKey,omitempty"` // WireGuard public key, reported by the agent PublicKey string `json:"publicKey,omitempty"` // WireGuard public key, reported by the agent
// Version is the release the program reports (e.g. v0.1.5). AutoUpdate says whether it may update // Version is the release the program reports (e.g. v0.1.5). AutoUpdate says whether it may update
@@ -125,6 +127,7 @@ type Mapping struct {
Hostname string `json:"hostname,omitempty"` // web/tls only; "*.example.com" allowed Hostname string `json:"hostname,omitempty"` // web/tls only; "*.example.com" allowed
Targets []Target `json:"targets"` // udp uses only the first Targets []Target `json:"targets"` // udp uses only the first
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"` Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Tags []string `json:"tags,omitempty"` // labels for grouping and filtering in the dashboard
// ProxyProtocol ("v1" or "v2") makes the edge start each tcp/tls connection to the // ProxyProtocol ("v1" or "v2") makes the edge start each tcp/tls connection to the
// target with a PROXY protocol header carrying the real client address. // target with a PROXY protocol header carrying the real client address.
ProxyProtocol string `json:"proxyProtocol,omitempty"` ProxyProtocol string `json:"proxyProtocol,omitempty"`
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// Package secretbox encrypts small secrets (tokens, passwords, private keys)
// before they are written to the database, using AES-256-GCM.
//
// Sealed values look like "enc1:<base64>". Opening a value that isn't sealed
// returns it unchanged, so data written before encryption was turned on is
// still readable and gets sealed the next time it is saved.
package secretbox
import (
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"strings"
)
const prefix = "enc1:"
type Box struct{ aead cipher.AEAD }
// GenerateKey returns a new random key in the form New accepts.
func GenerateKey() string {
b := make([]byte, 32)
rand.Read(b)
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
}
// New builds a Box from a key given as base64 or hex of 32 bytes. Any other
// text is treated as a passphrase and stretched with SHA-256.
func New(key string) (*Box, error) {
key = strings.TrimSpace(key)
if key == "" {
return nil, errors.New("empty key")
}
raw := decodeKey(key)
block, err := aes.NewCipher(raw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Box{aead: aead}, nil
}
func decodeKey(key string) []byte {
if b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(key); err == nil && len(b) == 32 {
return b
}
if b, err := hex.DecodeString(key); err == nil && len(b) == 32 {
return b
}
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
return sum[:]
}
// Seal encrypts s. The empty string stays empty so unset secrets stay visibly unset.
func (b *Box) Seal(s string) string {
if s == "" || strings.HasPrefix(s, prefix) {
return s
}
nonce := make([]byte, b.aead.NonceSize())
rand.Read(nonce)
return prefix + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(b.aead.Seal(nonce, nonce, []byte(s), nil))
}
// Open decrypts a sealed value. A wrong key or damaged data is an error, so a
// bad key can never silently turn secrets into garbage.
func (b *Box) Open(s string) (string, error) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(s, prefix) {
return s, nil
}
raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s[len(prefix):])
if err != nil || len(raw) < b.aead.NonceSize() {
return "", errors.New("damaged secret")
}
n := b.aead.NonceSize()
plain, err := b.aead.Open(nil, raw[:n], raw[n:], nil)
if err != nil {
return "", errors.New("can't decrypt a stored secret: is HAMMERHEAD_MASTER_KEY the key it was saved with?")
}
return string(plain), nil
}
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package secretbox
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestSealOpenRoundTripAndKeys(t *testing.T) {
key := GenerateKey()
b, err := New(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sealed := b.Seal("hunter2")
if !strings.HasPrefix(sealed, "enc1:") || strings.Contains(sealed, "hunter2") {
t.Fatalf("not sealed: %q", sealed)
}
if again := b.Seal("hunter2"); again == sealed {
t.Error("two seals of the same value must differ (random nonce)")
}
if b.Seal(sealed) != sealed {
t.Error("sealing an already sealed value must not double-encrypt")
}
if got, err := b.Open(sealed); err != nil || got != "hunter2" {
t.Errorf("Open = %q, %v", got, err)
}
if got, _ := b.Open("legacy plaintext"); got != "legacy plaintext" {
t.Errorf("unsealed legacy data should pass through, got %q", got)
}
if b.Seal("") != "" {
t.Error("empty stays empty")
}
other, _ := New(GenerateKey())
if _, err := other.Open(sealed); err == nil {
t.Error("the wrong key must fail loudly, not return garbage")
}
if _, err := b.Open(sealed[:len(sealed)-4] + "AAAA"); err == nil {
t.Error("tampered data must fail")
}
// a passphrase works as a key, and is stable
p1, _ := New("correct horse battery staple")
p2, _ := New("correct horse battery staple")
if got, err := p2.Open(p1.Seal("x")); err != nil || got != "x" {
t.Errorf("passphrase keys must be reproducible: %q %v", got, err)
}
if _, err := New(" "); err == nil {
t.Error("an empty key must be rejected")
}
}